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CIVIL RIGHTS
Supreme Court Takes Up School Bathroom Issue  
Transgender high schooler Gavin Grimm’s effort to use boys’ facilities could establish key precedent
BY ARTHUR S. LEONARD
I n a case that could have significant implications for how the courts view gen-der identity discrimination — and per-haps sexual orientation, as well — the 
Supreme Court, on October 28, announced it 
will review the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals’ 
decision in Gloucester County School Board v. 
G.G., which upheld the Department of Educa-
tion’s requirement that a Virginia school dis-
trict let a transgender teenage boy use the boys’ 
restroom facilities.
The April 19 ruling by the Fourth Circuit 
overturned a 2015 district court ruling that 
found that the DOE overstepped its authority 
in its interpretation of Title IX of the Education 
Amendments Act of 1972.
The Gloucester case has been closely watched 
by LGBT lawyers and legal commentators 
because it provides the high court with a vehi-
cle to examine the broader question of whether 
federal laws prohibiting discrimination “because 
of sex,” most passed decades ago, can now be 
construed to forbid gender identity discrimina-
tion and, maybe, also sexual orientation discrim-
ination, despite the obvious fact that legislators 
in 1960s and 1970s had no such intent when 
enacting those statutes.
Framed a different way, the question is one 
repeatedly raised by the late Justice Antonin 
Scalia: Are we governed by the intentions of our 
legislators or should the courts rely instead on 
reasonable interpretations of the actual text of 
the law? Scalia, who was an ardent foe of using 
“legislative history” as a method of statutory 
interpretation, decisively argued that courts 
should focus on the language of the statute, not 
viewed in isolation but rather in the context of 
the overall law, including any specific declara-
tion of congressional purpose contained in it.
On that point, ironically, this justice who 
was notoriously hostile to gay rights claims won 
unanimous concurrence by his colleagues in a 
significant 1998 ruling that laid the groundwork 
for advances in LGBT rights. In Oncale v. Sun-
downer Offshore Services, Inc., the court held 
that a man employed in an all-male workplace 
could maintain an action for hostile environment 
sexual harassment under Title VII of the 1964 
Civil Right Act, even though it was unlikely that 
Congress at that time was thinking about same-
sex harassment when it included “sex” as a for-
bidden grounds for workplace discrimination.
Relying on the statutory text, Scalia wrote that 
Joseph Oncale, who was sodomized with a bar 
of soap and threatened with rape, would have 
a valid Title VII claim if he could prove that he 
was harassed “because of sex” as specified by 
the 1964 law. The Equal Employment Oppor-
tunity Commission (EEOC) has prominently 
quoted from Scalia’s Oncale opinion in its feder-
al employment rulings in the last several years 
holding that discrimination because of gender 
identity and sexual orientation is “necessarily” 
discrimination “because of sex,” even though the 
1964 Congress would not have thought so.
Though the claims of Gavin Grimm, the trans-
gender plaintiff in the Gloucester case, do not 
directly involve Title VII, federal courts have gen-
erally followed Title VII precedents when they 
interpret the sex discrimination ban in Title IX, 
as the Fourth Circuit explained in this case.
The controversy arose when fellow students 
and their parents objected to Grimm using the 
boys’ restrooms during fall term of his sopho-
more year, in 2014. The high school’s principal 
had given Grimm permission to use the boys’ 
restrooms after learning of his transition and 
his discomfort with continuing to use the girls’ 
restrooms, since he was dressing, grooming, 
and — most significantly — strongly identify-
ing as male.
Responding to the complaints, the Glouces-
ter County School Board established a policy 
under which students were required to use the 
restroom consistent with their “biological sex” 
as identified on their birth certificate or to use a 
private gender-neutral restroom, of which there 
were a few in the high school. Grimm enlisted 
the American Civil Liberties Union of Virginia to 
sue the school board, and the case was assigned 
to District Judge Robert G. Doumar, who was 
appointed by President Ronald Reagan in 1981. 
Grimm’s complaint relied on Title IX as well as 
the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amend-
ment.
In ruling on Grimm’s motion for preliminary 
injunction, Doumar found that he could not 
sustain a Title IX claim because its regulations 
expressly allow schools to maintain separate 
restroom facilities for boys and girls based on 
“sex,” so it was not unlawful for Grimm’s school 
to require him to use restrooms consistent with 
his “sex” which, in the school board’s view, was 
female.
The district judge rejected the ACLU’s claim 
that he should defer to the DOE interpretation 
of the “bathroom regulation,” articulated in a let-
ter the department’s Office of Civil Rights (OCR) 
sent in January 2015 as a “party in interest” in 
response to Grimm’s request for its assistance. 
The OCR took the position, consistent with 
recent developments in sex discrimination law, 
that Grimm should be treated as a boy because 
it was undisputed that this is his gender identity 
and so under the regulation he was entitled to 
use the boy’s restroom — though he could also 
request as an accommodation to have access to 
a private gender-neutral facility.
To Doumar, the regulation’s text was clear 
and unambiguous, so the OCR’s attempt to 
interpret the regulation in favor of Grimm’s 
claim was not entitled to deference from the 
court. To accord that interpretation deference, 
he wrote, would allow the OCR to “create a 
de facto new regulation.” If the OCR wanted 
to change the regulation, the judge found, it 
should go through the time-consuming proce-
dures set out in the Administrative Procedure 
Act, which would be subject to review in the 
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals.
In his opinion, Doumar referred to Grimm 
as a “natal female,” unwilling to credit the 
idea that for Title IX purposes he should be 
treated as a boy. The case, the judge conclud-
ed, presented the simple question whether 
the school board had to let a girl use the boy’s 
restroom, and under the “clear” regulation 
the answer was “no.”
Doumar dismissed Grimm’s Title IX claim, 
and reserved judgment on his Equal Protection 
claim.
When Grimm appealed to the Fourth Cir-
cuit, Doumar was reversed in a 2-1 opinion 
this past April 19. Where Doumar saw clarity in 
the regulation, the Fourth Circuit majority saw 
ambiguity. Though Title IX clearly called for sep-
arate facilities for boys and girls, it said nothing 
directly about which restrooms transgender stu-
dents could use. Unlike Doumar, the majority 
was unwilling to accept the school board’s argu-
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ment that a person’s sex is definite-
ly established by their birth certifi-
cate, taking took note of the devel-
oping case law in other circuits and 
in many district courts accepting 
the proposition that sex discrimi-
nation laws are concerned not just 
with genetic or “biological” sex but 
rather with the range of factors and 
characteristics that go into gen-
der, including gender identity and 
expression.
Many federal courts, including 
several on the appellate level, now 
accept the proposition that gender 
identity and sex are inextricably 
related, that gender dysphoria and 
transgender identity are real phe-
nomena that deeply affect the iden-
tity of people, and that transgender 
people are entitled to be treated con-
sistent with their gender identity.
Given the ambiguity it identified, 
the Fourth Circuit relied on Auer 
v. Robbins, a 1997 Supreme Court 
ruling that an agency’s interpre-
tation of its own ambiguous regu-
lation should be given controlling 
weight by the court unless that 
interpretation is “plainly erroneous 
or inconsistent with the regulation 
or statute.” A reasonable agency 
interpretation of an ambiguous reg-
ulation, then, should be given def-
erence by the court. The majority 
sent the matter back to Doumar for 
reconsideration and stressed the 
urgency of the matter.
Doumar responded quickly, 
granting Grimm the preliminary 
injunction he sought on June 23. 
Seeking a stay of that injunction, 
the school board was unsuccessful 
with both Doumar and the Fourth 
Circuit, but won a stay from the 
Supreme Court on August 3 in a 
5-3 vote, before Grimm was able to 
start his senior year.
One among the five-court major-
ity, Justice Stephen Breyer, took 
the unusual step of explaining his 
decision to vote with the court’s 
four-member conservative faction, 
saying it was an “accommodation.” 
In retrospect, it seems likely Breyer 
understood the four conservatives 
would provide the votes necessary 
to hear the case on appeal and 
was voting to maintain the status 
quo pending final resolution at the 
Supreme Court.
After the school board filed its 
petition for high court review, 
more than a dozen amicus briefs 
in support or opposition were 
quickly filed, as well, including 
briefs from a number of states 
and members of Congress. Media 
interest in this case will undoubt-
edly remain very high.
The Supreme Court has agreed 
to consider two questions raised in 
the school board petition: whether 
the 1997 Auer precedent is appro-
priately applied in a case the school 
board described as “an unpub-
lished agency letter that, among 
other things, does not carry the 
force of law and was adopted in the 
context of the very dispute in which 
deference is sought,” and wheth-
er the DOE’s interpretation of Title 
IX and the bathroom regulation 
should be “given effect.”
The court could go down several 
different paths in resolving these 
questions. It might agree with the 
school board that no deference is 
due to an agency position formulat-
ed in response to a particular case 
and expressed in an unpublished 
agency letter — though the Fourth 
Circuit noted that the DOE pub-
lished online an OCR statement 
setting forth the same view a month 
before its letter in the Grimm case. 
The court making this finding 
would send the case back to the 
Fourth Circuit for its reconsider-
ation of whether the Title IX claim 
was properly dismissed by Doumar 
at the outset in the absence of any 
requirement to defer to the DOE 
interpretation.
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Or, the high court could tackle 
the substantive issue and decide 
whether interpreting Title IX to 
extend to gender identity discrim-
ination claims is a viable interpre-
tation, in light of its seminal 1989 
ruling in Price Waterhouse v. Hop-
kins that an employer’s use of sex 
stereotypes in denying an employ-
ee’s promotion was evidence of 
intentional discrimination based 
on “sex.” It was that ruling that 
eventually led federal courts to 
conclude that because transgender 
people generally do not conform to 
sex stereotypes concerning their 
“biological” sex at birth, discrim-
ination against them is a form of 
“sex discrimination” in violation 
of federal laws including the Fair 
Credit Act, the Violence Against 
Women Act, and Title VII of the 
Civil Rights Act.
The EEOC also relied on Price 
Waterhouse in reaching its 2012 
conclusion that transgender 
plaintiffs could assert discrimi-
nation claims under Title VII. The 
Sixth and 11th Circuit Courts 
of Appeals have similarly looked 
to that 1989 case in finding that 
claims of gender identity discrim-
ination asserted by public employ-
ees should be treated the same as 
sex discrimination claims under 
the 14th Amendment’s Equal Pro-
tection Clause.
Were the Supreme Court to rule 
by majority vote that laws banning 
discrimination “because of sex” 
also “necessarily” cover discrim-
ination because of gender identi-
ty, rather than issuing a narrow-
er ruling focusing solely on Title 
IX, one could plausibly argue that 
the pending Equality Act need not 
include the category of “gender 
identity” in order to establish a 
federal policy against gender iden-
tity discrimination under all sex 
discrimination laws. The Supreme 
Court, however, has generally pre-
ferred to decide statutory interpre-
tation cases on narrow grounds.
This case will most likely be 
argued early in 2017, and it may 
not be decided until the end of the 
Court’s term in June. Thus, it is 
possible that Grimm could win but 
never personally benefit as a stu-
dent at Gloucester County’s high 
school, since he should complete 
his students there next spring.
The Supreme Court has not 
granted as many petitions as usual 
so far this fall, leading to specula-
tion that it is trying to avoid grant-
ing review in cases where the jus-
tices might be predictably split 
evenly on the outcome and so not 
be able to render a decision estab-
lishing a precedent. If the Senate 
Republicans stand firm on their 
position that President Barack 
Obama’s nominee for the vacant 
seat, US Court of Appeals Judge 
Merrick Garland, will not be con-
sidered for confirmation, it is pos-
sible that the Court will have only 
eight justices when the Gloucester 
case is argued.
A tie vote by the court would 
leave in place the Fourth Circuit’s 
decision in Grimm’s favor, but it 
would not establish any prece-
dent beyond there. And there is 
also the possibility that Grimm’s 
graduation from high school will 
be found to have mooted the case. 
Since the case was brought by him 
rather than the DOE or the Justice 
Department, Grimm’s standing 
remains an issue throughout con-
sideration of this case.
c SUPREME COURT, from p.13
MANTA SPA
FOCUSING ON MAN TO MAN MASSAGE
O F F E R I N G  TA B L E  S H O W E R S 
&  B O D Y  S C R U B S
1 1  S K I L L E D  T H E R A P I S T S 
W I T H  A  D I V E R S E  R A N G E
O F  B A C K G R O U N D S  &  S K I L L S
OPE N  E V E RY DAY  F RO M  10 A M –2 A M
300 WEST 56TH STREET (AT  8TH AVE) BUZZER 2F
VISIT US ONLINE AT: MANTASPA.COM
TO MAKE AN APPOINTMENT CALL 212-757-3688 
